The Price of Populism: The Labour Party’s Recognition of Palestine and the Illusion of Middle Eastern Peace

Mayer Meir Kaltenbrunner, Ph.D.

Writer • Journalist • Doctor of Philosophy

Kaltenbrunner Press
Norway • © 2026

                   Political analytical article with elements of an opinion piece 

Populism became the primary survival tool for politically bankrupt leaders. On the eve of the parliamentary elections on September 8, 2025, the Norwegian Labour Party faced a deep electoral crisis. Lacking real economic achievements and a coherent domestic strategy, the government of Jonas Gahr Støre relied on the cheapest tool of political survival: international populism and demagoguery. Instead of solving the pressing problems of the Kingdom's citizens, the party leadership chose to play the foreign policy card, turning the highly complex Middle Eastern conflict into a bargaining chip for their election race.

The hasty and ill-considered vote to recognize the State of Palestine demonstrated a critical level of incompetence within the ruling elite at that time. Labour Party functionaries manifested an absolute blind spot in geopolitics, completely ignoring the fact that Palestinian statehood currently lacks basic institutions, unified governance, and economic autonomy. This vote became a triumph of emotion over common sense and legal reality, poorly masked as a "struggle for justice".

The migrant electorate served as the specific target audience for the left-wing platform. By unchecked distribution of Norwegian passports and residency permits for years to individuals from Islamic countries in the Middle East and Asia, the Labour Party deliberately built a loyal electoral pool. Recognizing Palestine was a direct, cynical signal to this growing population segment that the Norwegian left was willing to bend the state system to match external religious and political markers in exchange for votes at the ballot box.

Electoral bribery was practically carried out right at the aircraft steps. Events like the Prime Minister meeting "refugees" at Gardermoen airport exposed this political tactic. Welcoming individuals on a state level who had lived in Gaza for years while pocketing Norwegian social benefits (NAV) is not humanitarianism, but blatant electoral bribery. The Labour Party essentially launched its campaign right inside the airport terminal, prioritizing the interests of newly minted citizens over the security and laws of the native population.

The triumph of demagoguery completely overshadowed national security interests. For the sake of retaining short-term power, leftist politicians turned a blind eye to radicalization and the rise of antisemitism within the country. Demagogic slogans about "freedom," echoed from government podiums, unleashed radical Islamic groups on the streets of Oslo. The Norwegian Security Service (PST) and the police became hostages to political opportunism, as clear threats to national security were deliberately ignored to preserve the fragile electoral balance of the leftist coalition.

Labour's populism reached the point of silencing direct statistical realities. While official departments recorded rising crime rates among individuals with migrant backgrounds, party leaders continued to broadcast an idealized image of "vulnerable refugees". The confrontation with reality—where hundreds of radicals openly abuse the Norwegian welfare system to fund prolonged stays in enclaves controlled by Hamas—was completely erased from the leftist pre-election agenda.

This aggressive migrant populism provided the toxic boost needed for the election results on September 8, 2025. Mobilizing diasporas and newly registered citizens from Islamic nations allowed the Labour Party to compensate for a catastrophic drain of traditional Norwegian voters. The left managed to stay afloat solely by artificially altering the demographic and electoral landscape of Norway, leaving the country's political future dependent on migrant votes.

The actions of the Støre government on the eve of the elections amounted to a betrayal of traditional Norwegian democracy, which for centuries was built on the principles of the rule of law, transparency, and mutual accountability. By replacing calculated diplomacy with street slogans, the Labour Party deeply fractured society. The Prime Minister ceased to be a unifying figure for the nation, morphing instead into a party boss serving the interests of a radicalized electorate.

Voting to recognize a non-existent Palestinian state dealt a heavy blow to Norway's international reputation as a balanced and impartial mediator. The leftist government sacrificed strategic relations with democratic allies just to appease a radicalized street crowd in Oslo. This decision stands as a textbook example of a diplomatic capitulation to common sense for the sake of boosting party poll ratings.

However, the tactical success of the Labour Party in the September 2025 elections planted a ticking time bomb beneath Norwegian statehood. A government formed on the foundation of migrant populism and demagoguery is inherently incapable of handling mounting economic and social crises. It is entirely evident that this coalition will fail to complete its full term, and by 2027, Norway will inevitably face an early dissolution of parliament as the natural finale of leftist populism.

After the elections of September 8, 2025, it became definitively clear that Norway’s political system had entered an entirely new era. This was no longer merely about a change of parties, nor simply a contest between the political left and right, or even the familiar economic debates surrounding taxation, electricity prices, and social spending. The Kingdom was gradually moving toward a new model of electoral politics in which demographics, migration, and emotional political mobilization were beginning to play a central role.

The Norwegian Labour Party proved remarkably capable of sensing this historical turning point. Throughout the campaign, the party acted less like a traditional social-democratic organization and more like a vast political mechanism designed to unite different voter groups around emotional and symbolic themes. For this reason, the election campaign increasingly resembled not a rational political debate, but rather a large-scale exercise in political psychology.

This development was particularly visible in Buskerud and the surrounding territories, where historically there had been a strong working-class population, industrial communities, and citizens oriented toward social stability and the traditional welfare state. Yet over recent years, the demographic composition of the region has changed substantially. Municipalities that only two decades ago were perceived as relatively homogeneous now represent an entirely different political and social landscape.

The Labour Party understood one essential reality: the new electorate was less interested in complex economic programs than in emotional recognition, symbolic support, and the feeling of political protection. Consequently, the campaign increasingly focused on themes such as “inclusivity,” “anti-discrimination,” “international humanitarian responsibility,” and the “fight against hatred.” These themes were presented not merely as political issues, but as moral imperatives, transforming political choice into a question of ethical alignment rather than practical governance.

Critics argued that this strategy represented a new form of contemporary populism — not national populism, but moral and ideological populism. Voters were offered not so much concrete solutions as an emotional identity: if one supported the party, one was placed on the “right side of history.” If one expressed criticism, one risked being pushed beyond the boundaries of socially acceptable discourse.

In many areas of Buskerud, this produced growing frustration. Increasing numbers of citizens began to feel that the political establishment no longer listened to ordinary people. Questions concerning crime, integration, pressure on the welfare system, declining trust in law enforcement, rising municipal expenditures, and the cultural fragmentation of society often remained unanswered. Instead, the public sphere was flooded with politically correct slogans and symbolic declarations.

The 2025 campaign also revealed how profoundly the support structure of the Labour Party had changed. Historically, the party’s foundation rested upon trade unions, industrial workers, manufacturing sectors, and the traditional Norwegian social-democratic model. Today, however, the party increasingly builds its political base upon new urban coalitions, the bureaucratic apparatus, the public sector, and significant segments of the migrant electorate.

For many political analysts, this represented the most significant development of the election. In essence, Norway appears to be entering a political model in which major parties are becoming increasingly dependent upon demographic transformation. Migration policy, therefore, is no longer viewed solely as a humanitarian or social issue, but also as an instrument of long-term electoral influence.

This explains why the election results generated such intense political tension. One part of society viewed the Labour Party’s success as proof that Norway remained an open, modern, and internationally oriented state. Another segment perceived it as evidence that the traditional Norwegian model of national trust, cohesion, and social solidarity was gradually being weakened under the pressure of a new political reality.

The role of the media was particularly significant in this process. Many residents of Buskerud openly argued that major media institutions were increasingly functioning not as independent watchdogs over political power, but rather as moral and ideological supporters of the ruling political direction. Criticism of migration policy was frequently portrayed as dangerous radicalism, while real social concerns in certain municipalities were effectively pushed outside the boundaries of acceptable public discussion.

Against this background, a growing sense of political alienation emerged. More and more citizens began to perceive the parliamentary system as a structure existing separately from the population itself. This became one of the most troubling consequences of the 2025 elections, because a crisis of trust is often the beginning of a deeper institutional and governmental crisis.

For many years, Norway’s political elite lived with the assumption that the country possessed an almost unlimited reserve of social stability. However, the elections of 2025 demonstrated that even the Norwegian model is no longer untouchable. Public fatigue is increasing — fatigue with ideological politics, moralizing rhetoric, and attempts to replace substantive reforms with emotionally charged narratives.

In this respect, Buskerud became a symbolic reflection of the entire country. It was here that the conflict between the “old Norway” — characterized by trust, social responsibility, and national cohesion — and the “new Norway,” increasingly shaped by global political trends, fragmented identities, and electoral calculations, became especially visible.

For this reason, the results of September 8, 2025, are likely to remain the subject of political debate, analytical essays, and social controversy for many years to come. Because this is no longer merely about the victory of one political party over another. It is about a far larger and more consequential question: what kind of Norway will emerge over the next twenty years.

The political establishment of Norway may still believe that the old mechanisms of consensus and social stability remain intact. Yet the elections of 2025 revealed something far deeper — the gradual fragmentation of a society that for decades had been viewed as one of the most stable democracies in Europe. What once appeared unshakable now increasingly shows visible signs of tension beneath the surface.

For generations, Norway built its political culture upon an unusually high level of public trust. Citizens trusted institutions, trusted the media, trusted political parties, and trusted that the state ultimately acted in the collective national interest. This social trust became one of the greatest strengths of the Norwegian model. However, trust is a fragile political resource. Once people begin to feel that important public concerns are no longer openly discussed, or that criticism itself becomes socially dangerous, the foundations of democratic cohesion slowly begin to erode.

The significance of the 2025 elections therefore extends far beyond ordinary electoral statistics. What emerged was not merely a political victory for one party, but evidence of a deeper structural transformation taking place within Norwegian society itself. Demographic change, migration, globalization, and ideological polarization are no longer secondary political questions — they are becoming central forces shaping the future architecture of the state.

At the same time, an important paradox has emerged across much of Europe, including Norway. For decades, political elites warned society about the dangers of populism. Yet increasingly, critics argue that populism itself has changed form. It no longer exists exclusively within nationalist or anti-establishment movements. Instead, a new kind of institutional populism has appeared — one built not around national slogans, but around moral narratives, symbolic politics, emotional mobilization, and the division of society into categories of “acceptable” and “unacceptable” opinion.

In this atmosphere, many ordinary citizens no longer feel represented by political institutions in the traditional sense. They increasingly perceive politics as a closed ideological system where major cultural and social questions are discussed only within carefully controlled boundaries. This perception — whether accurate or exaggerated — has itself become a powerful political force. And once a society enters a cycle of mutual distrust between the governing class and significant parts of the population, political polarization tends to deepen with each successive election.

Buskerud became one of the clearest reflections of this broader transformation. The region illustrated not only electoral change, but also the emergence of two increasingly different visions of Norway’s future. One vision sees the country as a fully globalized, multicultural, internationally integrated society shaped by post-national political values. The other seeks to preserve the traditional foundations of Norwegian social cohesion, cultural continuity, and national identity. The growing tension between these two visions may define Norwegian politics for many years ahead.

What makes this development particularly significant is that Norway was once widely regarded as a model of political balance, moderation, and institutional stability. If even Norway now experiences growing social fragmentation, ideological polarization, and declining public trust, many observers will inevitably ask whether this reflects not simply a national issue, but a broader European transformation unfolding across the continent.

The elections of September 8, 2025, may therefore be remembered not merely as another democratic event within the Kingdom of Norway, but as a symbolic turning point — a moment when underlying tensions that had been building quietly for years became impossible to ignore. Because beneath the electoral numbers lies a far more profound question: whether modern European democracies can continue to preserve social unity in an era increasingly shaped by demographic transformation, cultural fragmentation, and emotionally driven politics.

And perhaps that is the central lesson of Buskerud itself. Political systems may adapt to changing electorates, parties may reinvent their strategies, and governments may temporarily preserve stability through rhetoric and coalition-building. But no democratic society can remain truly stable if large parts of the population begin to feel culturally disconnected from the direction in which their country is moving.

For this reason, the debates surrounding Norway after the elections of 2025 are unlikely to disappear. On the contrary, they may only intensify in the years ahead. Because the central question facing Norway is no longer simply which party governs the country. The deeper question is whether the traditional Norwegian social model — built upon trust, cohesion, moderation, and shared national identity — can survive the pressures of a rapidly changing political and demographic era.

According to official statistics from the Norwegian Statistical Office, the most important and leading crime rate in the Kingdom, and the number of people convicted of particularly serious crimes committed in the Kingdom, are so-called "migrant refugees" from Palestine—more than 989 people.

At the same time, an interesting fact arises: why on November 18, 2023...

The so-called Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Norway, Jonas Gahr Støre, from the same so- called "Labour Party," is meeting a group of radical Muslim Palestinians who will arrive private jet from Egypt to Gardermoen at 8:00 PM. The Prime Minister thus notes that this is an exceptional event, which he intends to highlight.

The war in Gaza evokes many strong emotions. It could be said that by taking to the streets on Saturday evening, Støre is fueling a mobilization that is already strong. Norway is the only Nordic country to vote for a ceasefire without making demands on Hamas regarding the 250 hostages and nearly 2,000 citizens killed, 800 of whom were foreign nationals. This serious circumstance may have forced the Israelis to suspend the evacuation of Norwegian citizens. Priority was given to citizens of other countries. Norway is increasingly perceived as pro- Palestinian and pro-Hamas. This will complicate its new role as a mediator.

Should this Norwegian prime minister shed light on the "refugees" who fled to Palestine for their lives, received Norwegian residency permits, and then went on vacation to the country they fled? If I were prime minister, I would confiscate their passports upon landing in Norway and return the plane. I would also instruct the Norwegian Security Service (PST) and the Norwegian National Police Directorate (NPD) to investigate all the facts surrounding these so- called "refugees" for their prolonged stay in the radical Muslim terrorist enclave called GAZA.

For 20 years I have been unable to travel to Turkmenistan to bury, commit to the earth, or perform the burial rite of my close relatives and my friends.

I have been away from my homeland of Turkmenistan for 22 years. During this time, many of my relatives and friends have died, and I was unable to give them a proper burial because my God-damned Turkmenistan is home to an extremely horrific, brutal, authoritarian dictatorship, equal only to North Korea and Islamic Iran.

How did these people with Norwegian passports, including travel passports, end up in this terrorist, Islamic, radical enclave of GAZA?!

Sympathy for those who find themselves in this stressful situation. But on the other hand: expect the vast majority of them/all of them to receive assistance in starting a new life and receive generous state funds and support in this society – precisely because they could NOT live in Gaza.

Otherwise, it is extremely sad that our politicians seem to have completely forgotten about Israelis and Jews.

The people who build society and democracy, many of them, speak generously of Palestinians (and give them jobs, positions in the country's leadership) – in contrast to all the angry cries directed at Jews from the "vulnerable and defenseless."

The Norwegian Prime Minister greets you at the airport, generously throws weapons and money into the air, and rejoices that the "Norwegians" are home.

Rarely has anyone—even the "state"—welcomed people who likely deceived and lied to society/community.

If they came as "refugees" because living in Gaza was "too dangerous": a "hellish yard," a "prison," a "concentration camp," etc.—is it strange that people say they had to "leave their home" in a place where families with school-age children live?

I don't know the rules, but is it possible to receive full social security, child support, etc., even if you've lived abroad, outside the EU, for a long time?

I see someone has lived there for many years!

They're just moving into their apartment/house (paid for by us?) to get their NAV stamped? Of course, there are a lot of stories here, but it would be very interesting to know.

When they arrive, the waiting room will be full, but I hope that representatives from the NAV and the tax office will also come during registration to check on the situation?

Perhaps this is an even more compelling reason to evacuate those who haven't requested Norway's assistance...

Støre and his group, the so-called "Labour Party" of Norway, have already launched their election campaign from the airport, collecting votes from all those current and former "migrant refugees" from Islamic Muslim countries in Asia and the Middle East—a potential electorate for the Labour Party. But they likely stand to lose far more than they gain. But damn, they get into the elite chamber, where they make a pilgrimage.

How wonderful that the people's representative is standing up for our "Norwegian brothers and sisters" in Gaza. I think people need to unite, because Sylvi Listhaug is currently our best bet. It's entirely possible that the "newly elected" government from the Norwegian Labour Party, elected on September 8, 2025, will not complete its term. I believe that, as a result of looming serious political and economic problems, this government will fall early by 2027, and parliament and its corrupt government will be dissolved.

As a rule, criticism should be supported by sound, well-reasoned arguments. In exceptional cases, as in this case, reasoned arguments are unnecessary.

A complete ethical catastrophe – at the government's behest.

The government likely completely misunderstands the essence of this so-called Palestinian conflict.

A reminder that Norway's approach to the conflict is determined by the best representatives of the Labour Party.

Støre meets people at the airport who have barely ever been to Norway: they were here and received social security from NAV, and since then, most of them have remained in Gaza with their children.

Støre is not a unifying figure for the people, even with a minimum level of decency. Here, he demonstrates a disgusting judgment that will haunt him and the country for years to come.

He is no longer my prime minister. I see no reason to respect him or his decisions in the future—I don't think Norway has ever had anyone as morally depraved as Støre in that position (not since Quisling).

He hasn't understood the ideology of conquest he's playing with.

We, the people of Norway, not the electorate of the Labour Party, are simply tired of this madness. 75% of so-called Palestinians are guaranteed to support Hamas. What will we do with these murderers in Norway?

When almost 1,000 people from Palestine are already serving sentences in prisons in Norway for particularly serious crimes!!!

How can people who escaped from the "world's largest prison" be returning on vacation? There's hardly any reason to celebrate their return.

They say about half of them are children. This again means they're not just vacationing, but rather that the "refugees" want to return to Gaza to prevent the children from being influenced by Western traditions, Koranic schools, and Islamic ideology.

They should have been stripped of their citizenship. They're just migrants receiving social assistance.

Støre's appearance in Gardermoen is simply disgusting. I know he didn't show up when the plane carrying Israeli refugees landed in Norway.

They should be immediately taken to a detention center for a medical examination, and representatives of the Foreign Ministry and the police should investigate each of them to determine the reason for their trip to Gaza, the country they fled, and their intention to seek asylum in Norway. Furthermore, school-age children were removed from the Norwegian education system for 10 months straight.

The children likely attended Hamas schools and received a good dose of education about the extermination of Jews, suicide bombings, and so on.

This is a compulsory subject in Gaza's elementary schools, funded in part by Norwegian aid.

Here in Norway, both children and adults can continue their education in the new Muslim territory in Oslo, where there is a shooting range, etc.

"Child soldiers" and child "killers" are a completely natural phenomenon among Muslims, because even the stupid infidels don't punish them.

Double standards are everywhere; that's what's incredibly crude. And they defend it.

Perhaps it adds more kindness to bringing in people from other countries rather than their own citizens.

And so the children lined up with Palestinian flags to greet the returning "Norwegians"—two young men greeted their father. "Finally, the state did something to bring my father back" – but why was my father there at all?

There's barely any gratitude in sight – one could have laughed at the "thank you, Norway"?

The only reason they came out was because they were given Norwegian passports. One has to wonder if some of them were participating in a march expressing hatred towards Israel and Jews – but NRK, like the media, will welcome them anyway – handing them a microphone stand, encouraging smiles, and gentle glances.

PURELY A PRIVATE OPINION

By yielding to pressure from the electorate, potential voters of former and current migrants from Islamic Muslim countries, who have been handed out Norwegian passports and citizenships for years without any oversight, even for refugees lacking even the most basic reliable information and documents, with questionable origins. The so-called Norwegian government, comprised of the so-called corrupt "Labour Party," thinks that the recent recognition of Palestine will resolve the conflict? What if it destroys everything they have? Palestinians have allegedly been fighting for state recognition for decades.

They're promised a capital, a state, freedom. But what if it's the other way around? What if recognition right now destroys humanitarian aid, strips them of their refugee status, and gives Israel the right to say:

"This is no longer our problem." Because a state isn't an emotion; it's a territory, it's power, and it's responsibility. And today, we'll examine the real meaning behind the phrase "1967 border." Why did Israel give

Sinai to Egypt but not Judea and Samaria? And who really benefits from recognizing Palestine?

These aren't Palestinians. Look at a map from before 1945-1948, a map on which Palestine never existed, and you'll understand why this recognition could be not an act of justice, but an act of liquidation.

What are the "1967 borders"—and why are they a myth?

From UN politicians to pro-Palestinian Muslim and sometimes radical activists on social media, crowds on the streets, unchecked by the authorities, repeat one formula.

 A Palestinian state must be established within the 1967 borders.

The only realistic, just, and sustainable solution is the creation of two states—Israel and Palestine—living side by side in peace and security within secure and recognized borders based on the 1967 lines. That sounds convincing, but let's understand what these borders are. And most importantly, whose borders they were. Here's the crux of the matter. No Palestinian state ever existed before 1967.

The term "1967 borders" is a diplomatic abstraction.

In reality, these are the ceasefire lines established after the 1948 War of Independence. That is, armies simply stopped here and hostilities ended. The borders of any Palestinian state were not recognized, and, well, one simply didn't exist.

 Before 1967, the situation was as follows: Gaza was under the complete military control of Egypt. Judea and Samaria, the so-called West Bank, was annexed by Jordan. Jordan then declared these lands its own. Only two countries, Great Britain and Pakistan, recognized this.

East Jerusalem was also under Jordanian control, and Jews were barred from entering. The Western Wall, the Temple Mount, the synagogues—everything was inaccessible.

Now, pay attention.

Neither Egypt nor Jordan created any Palestine there. No one raised a flag, established institutions, or spoke of independence. The UN, the US, the Arab countries—no one called these territories Palestinian.

Palestinians in those years were used as a population—mostly citizens of Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria—but not as a subject. And this is the key point. As long as the territories were under Arab control, no one even mentioned the idea of a Palestinian state. The situation changed only in June 1967, when Arab armies again massed at the Israeli borders. Egypt blockaded Israel's borders, Syria shelled

the Golan Heights. Israel struck. Within six days, it occupied Sinai, Gaza, Judea, Samaria, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. And only after this, for the first time, the international community suddenly begins to say: “These are the occupied Palestinian territories.”

But we've just seen that before 1967, these weren't Palestinian territories; they were Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian, and no Arab state ever considered creating a Palestine. In other words, the narrative of returning Palestinian lands to the Palestinians emerged only after the Arab countries lost them. Before that, they had no intention of returning anything to anyone. So, when discussing the 1967 borders, it's important to understand that this isn't about restoring justice, but rather an attempt to diplomatically reverse the consequences of a lost war.

The Gaza Strip is a humanitarian brand and a blueprint, not a blueprint for the future.

Today, the Palestinians don't have a state, but they have a stable system built over decades, based not on development, but on struggle and dependence. This isn't a state, but a political model, where everything is built around the conflict with Israel. Instead of building institutions, developing industry, and creating a tax base, everything is aimed at maintaining victimhood. Aid, the legitimacy of power, and funding are all tied to this. The central mechanism is humanitarian aid through this unique UN agency, which was created solely for the Palestinians. No other people—not the 55 million Kurds, not the 7 million Uyghurs, not the 9 million Isis, not the 5 million Rahinja, not the 4 million Darfurians—have their own UN structure. UNRWA doesn't solve the refugee problem. It makes them refugees forever, passing on this status by inheritance.

The Palestinian Authority's economy is 80% subsidized by Israel. Electricity and gas are mostly supplied by Israel. Water, too. Customs duties are collected by Israel. Healthcare and schools are provided by international organizations. There is no distinct governance model because one was never built. Why? Because the primary goal is not to create a country, but to continue the struggle. A slogan has replaced strategy. Legitimacy came not from reforms, but from the rhetoric of resistance. And here comes the key word "GAS." It's not just a territory; it's a global brand. Gaza is a headline, a drone, a newsworthy symbol. Behind this brand are billions of dollars in humanitarian aid that are uncontrolled and 150% completely plundered.

An entire industry operates through Gaza, including donor funds, logistics intermediaries, international NGOs, UN officials, and Arab organizations. Gaza is a vast, corrupt criminal market and a mechanism for redistributing funds, where no one monitors effectiveness, requires no accountability, and has no interest in ending the conflict.

And what a contrast: where are CNN's cameras when millions of Uyghurs are undergoing re-education in camps in Xinjiang, China. Who is taking to the streets in London, Oslo, Berlin, Rome, Paris, and other European cities over the hundreds of thousands of Yazidis killed in Sinjar? How many have you heard about the Darfuris destroyed in Sudan? Where are the protests about the Rahingya, the expulsions and murders from Myanmar? Why are there no protests in Oslo about the more than 5 million Kurds killed in Iran, Iraq, and Syria? Why are there no protests among various Islamic and pro-Palestinian groups in Oslo about the 185,000 Afghans killed in Afghanistan, where Norway participated in a coalition with other armies from 2001 to 2023? Why didn't anyone take to the streets of Oslo and other European cities to protest when 3,500,000 were killed in the African country of Rwanda?

Answer: there aren't any, because it's not a brand, because it's not Israel. Gaza has become an inflationary symbol of a humanitarian catastrophe that's profitable to leave unaddressed, rather than a reason to build a sustainable future. Now the question: If tomorrow the Palestinians are told, "You are a state," this entire framework is nullified. And what will happen then? What happens when it's recognized?

So, let's say Palestine is recognized as a full-fledged state tomorrow. What does this change? At first glance, everything looks good: a passport, a flag, a platform, the UN. But if you dig deeper, it's from this very moment that all the mechanisms that currently ensure the survival of the Palestinian system begin to crumble. Why? Because today, all existing

humanitarian and logistical channels operate within the framework of a special status, not as a state, but as an autonomous territory located in a conflict zone.

This status allows for direct aid from the UN through the UNHRC, access to international funding, and simplified access to supplies of resources, goods, medicine, and so on. This

is the case: once Palestine is recognized as a state, all these mechanisms lose their legal basis.

 The first effect is the liquidation of the Palestinian Affairs Agency. This agency was created exclusively for Palestinian refugees,

and, well, those who lack citizenship and permanent affiliation. And if you now have a state, a government passport, then you are no longer a refugee under international law, and therefore the agency loses its mandate.

The second effect is the aid regime. Currently, a significant portion of international aid comes precisely because the territory lacks an independent economy, and it is assumed that a resolution to the conflict has not yet been achieved. If the conflict is supposedly resolved and Palestine becomes a state, then direct subsidies are replaced by loans, subsidies, or cease altogether. Because no one is obligated to pay the state simply for its very existence.

The third point is resources and logistics. Today, supplies of water, electricity, fuel, and so on are subject to special conditions. This isn't a standard commercial arrangement, but a complex system of coordination based on international agreements.

After recognition, this is a relationship between two states, and neither is obligated to provide services to its neighbors for free or at subsidized rates. If they don't pay, they're cut off. There's no currency agreement, no supply, no security guarantee, and the border is closed.

The fourth aspect is economic channels. Currently, Israel collects VAT and customs duties for the Palestinian Authority, along with cargo passing through its ports, and transfers these funds to the Palestinian Authority. This is established within the framework of the Oslo Accords. If Palestine were to become a separate state tomorrow, Israel has every right to terminate this model. This is no longer an internal issue, but a foreign economic relationship that no one is obligated to maintain. Consequently, aid is stopped or drastically reduced, and infrastructure supplies are put on a commercial footing. International channels are losing their foundation, political and legal isolation is growing, and the system built on external funding and humanitarian exceptions is disappearing. And most importantly, neither Gaza, nor Judea and Samaria, nor the Palestinian Authority, nor the criminal Islamic group Hamas in Gaza are ready to govern themselves independently. There is no unified leadership, no tax system, no independent budget, no online banking system, no export model, no border control. This means that recognizing a state doesn't solve the problem; it simply absolves the world of responsibility. The Palestinians will be left with a flag, but without structures, without resources, without support, and without the survival mechanism that has existed for decades.

Where will this state be?

Okay, let's assume that tomorrow the entire world recognizes Palestine as a state. Then the main question arises: where will it physically be?

On the map, everything looks simple: Gaza, Judea, Samaria, East Jerusalem, but that's just on paper. When you look at reality, everything instantly crumbles when you look at the facts.

Let's start with Judea Samaria. This isn't a single piece of land where you can draw a line and say, "This is our country." Judea Samaria is a mosaic of governed zones with multiple intersections, built over decades through compromises and agreements. Hundreds of thousands of Israelis and tens of thousands of Palestinians live in this territory.

And between them are strategic roads and water sources, communications, and security lines. This isn't a question of expelling someone or giving something away. It's a question of how to ensure the safety of millions of people when some neighborhoods have one set of laws, while neighboring neighborhoods have completely different ones. No civilized, responsible state would hand over such territories to an entity that lacks a clear system of law and order, doesn't even control its own border, and is in conflict with itself. Israel spent 30 years building infrastructure on these lands not for expansion, but for security, logistics, defense, and coordination. For this very reason, any talk of an immediate handover of all of Judea Samaria is not realistic, but a slogan. 

Now let's look at the Gaza Strip. This is a territory that has long since fallen outside the control of the Palestinian Authority. A separate power structure operates there, one that not only rejects Israel, but also the Palestinian Authority itself, located in Romal. It is not part of a larger political project. It is a sort of autonomous, militarized, radical, medieval Islamic enclave. There is no direct control, no land connection, or even political unity between Gaza and Judea Samaria. Furthermore, Gaza and the Palestinian Authority have been in a state of political rift since 2007, and no international mediator has been able to achieve their unification.

Now let's look at Jerusalem. East Jerusalem is claimed as the future capital of Palestine, but Israel officially declared all of Jerusalem its united and indivisible capital back in 1980. This isn't just a formality; it's part of Israeli national identity, the right to history and control over holy sites. The transfer of East Jerusalem under current conditions is practically impossible. Not a single ruling party in Israel would propose it, and not a single voter would support it.

So, where will the Palestinian state be? Gaza is separate, the Palestinian Authority is separate, Jerusalem is undivided, there is no internal control, no external infrastructure. It's not a unified state, but a territorially and politically fragmented construct, incapable of being connected by roads, governance, or law.

Why did Israel give Sinai to Egypt, but not Judea and Samaria?

Now the argument is often heard: "Well, Israel returned Sinai, so it can give Judea to Samaria."

 Yes, this is indeed the result of the Camp David Accords—the Israeli- Egyptian peace treaty. In 1978, a preliminary agreement was reached at the Camp David summit in the United States, and in 1979, Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat signed the Israel-Egypt peace treaty in Washington.

 Yes, Israel did voluntarily withdraw all troops and civilians from the vast Sinai Peninsula. And it did so not under pressure or in panic, but within the framework of an official peace treaty with Egypt, one of its most powerful enemies in the past. That was 1979, Camp David. What did Israel get in return? Full recognition, an end to the war, the establishment of diplomatic relations, and, most importantly, security guarantees. Egypt signed the agreement, accepted its obligations, and fulfilled them. Since then, for over 40 years, there has been silence on Israel's southern border. No rockets, no invasions, no anarchy.

Now compare this with what's being proposed today in the case of Judea and Samaria. Is there a single, legitimate Palestinian side with which an agreement can be signed?

No.

Is there a stable authority controlling the territory? No.

Is there a guarantee that after Israel leaves, a civil war or a takeover by Islamic radical, medieval fanatics of Islamist extremism won't break out?

No.

Mahmoud Abbas doesn't control Gaza 150%; he's protected by Israeli security, which is why he's still alive, as Hamas would have killed him long ago. Gaza doesn't recognize Abbas, the Palestinian Authority, or the Oslo Accords. In practice, they live as two different regimes, without coordination, without a common policy, and without a common goal.

Now imagine Israel giving up key heights, roads, water sources, and border areas in the name of peace. Six months later, rockets appear in these territories, a year later, Islamic groups appear, and two years later, Tel Aviv is within mortar range.

This has happened before. In 2005, Israel completely withdrew its troops and civilians from Gaza, handing over control to the Palestinians. Two years later, in 2007, an armed coup occurred in Gaza. A fanatical radical Islamic group seized power. And since then, shelling has been ongoing.

Would anyone in Israel want to repeat this scenario, but this time in territory located 15 minutes from Jerusalem? That's why Sinai was returned, but Judea and Samaria are gone.

Sinai is a guaranteed treaty, with an army and borders. But Judea and Samaria is an area without even a partner with whom to sign a document.

Israel is not against compromise, but compromise is an exchange, not a unilateral surrender of strategic territories into the void.

Who benefits from this?

Now comes the most interesting part.

If recognizing the state of Palestine leads to economic collapse, political paralysis, and a humanitarian catastrophe, why do it at all?

And the answer is unpleasant, but simple. It benefits everyone except the Palestinians themselves. First,

the European Union. Scandinavian countries like Norway have been paying millions to the EU for decades to support the Palestinian Authority, to the UN and its agencies for Palestinian refugees, and to build institutions. There is virtually no accountability. The money is often embezzled by the officials themselves, the "Palestinian leaders," the funds disappear without a trace, and their influence is minimal. If Palestine becomes a state, the EU gets a perfect excuse to exit gracefully. We helped, they are now independent. It's no longer our problem. Budgets are freed up, and the political image is preserved.

Second, the Arab regime. The Gulf states, Jordan, and Egypt formally support the Palestinians, but at the same time, they do everything they can to ensure the conflict doesn't interfere with their business and relations with the West.

Recognizing the Palestinian state allows them to say, "Well, we've formally achieved recognition, the whole matter is closed, and now we'll get on with our own affairs." Responsibility is absolved, pressure is reduced, and the Palestinians are left to deal with their problems on their own.

Thirdly, international organizations—the UN, the World Bank, NGOs, human rights activists, humanitarian workers—all this structure thrives on the conflict. These involve huge budgets, conferences, missions, resolutions. As soon as a state emerges and the issue is formally considered closed, the entire system collapses. But many within it will be happy, because the conflict has dragged on, there are no results, fatigue has accumulated, and they want to leave gracefully.

Recognizing Palestine is a way out, an illusion of a solution without a real solution.

Who loses? Only the Palestinians themselves. They lose aid, lose protection, lose their status, and lose their tools of pressure. And most importantly, the understanding that the world still has some stake in their future.

Recognition of Palestine, which looks like a victory, is in fact a write- off. Political free-floating without navigation, map, or command.

Recognition without a foundation is a path to chaos, not peace.

We've reached the main point. Recognition of Palestine is not a path to peace, but a path to an even greater impasse. Why? Because peace is built on a contract, on balance, on clear terms of what you give and what you receive, on responsibility, on obligations, and on guarantees.

What's being proposed now?

Recognize Palestine without negotiations, establish borders that don't exist, name a capital that no one controls, and support a government that doesn't govern half its territory. This isn't the basis for peace; it's a substitute. Peace is possible when both sides are willing to commit.

Israel once made peace with Egypt, with the return of Sinai, with Jordan, with the Arab Emirates of Bahrain and Morocco, based on mutual recognition and mutual interest. In each case, there was an agreement, a calculation, and concrete steps.

And what about Palestine?

There is no unified government, no recognition of the very idea of a Jewish state, no willingness to compromise, no guarantee that there won't be explosions tomorrow, as happened after Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in 2005. And herein lies the paradox. The more they talk about a state, the further away the real possibility of peace recedes. Because the world believes the Palestinians have already gotten what they deserved. The Israelis believe that it's no longer their responsibility. The Palestinians understand that nothing has changed, and that chaos, hopelessness, and medieval Islamic radicalization are growing within the system. And in this shadow, a new generation is growing up that believes in neither peace, nor a state, nor the meaning of negotiations. So, a state without an economy is bankrupt. A state without a unified authority is civil war. A state without borders is an enclave. A state without control is a myth. And recognizing all this is not an act of justice, but a diplomatic capitulation to common sense.

A state is not proclaimed—it is built.

So, now that we've covered everything from economic geography to international politics, we can say the most important thing.

A Palestinian state is impossible today because it doesn't exist in structure, governance, or reality. Recognition without authority, recognition without an economy, recognition without territorial integrity, recognition without unity, without responsibility, without strategy. This is not the path forward, but a veiled rejection of the future.

 A state is not proclaimed at the behest of the Norwegian Parliament, by populism and demagoguery, or by the dictates of the leaders of the so- called "Norwegian Labour Party"—it is being built.

 So, now that we've covered everything from economic geography to international politics, we can say the main thing.

A state is not a UN podium, a flag, a social media post, or slogans, shouts, and criminal hooliganism under the pretext of "freedom for Palestine," exploiting freedom of speech, democracy, and the permissiveness that manifests itself under the flags of Palestine, with the connivance of the Norwegian media, the Norwegian Government, the Norwegian Police, and the Norwegian Security Service, on the streets of Oslo, in anti-Semitism and extremism perpetrated by pro- Palestinian and Islamic groups in Norway. A state is control over borders, a tax system, a monopoly on the use of force, a unified administration, international responsibility, and, most importantly, a willingness to bear the burden of sovereignty. If this is lacking, the state should not be recognized, but rather built from scratch: institutions, governance, and internal legitimacy.

 Otherwise, it becomes a trap, where the very act of recognition collapses everything that was still functioning, more or less: humanitarian aid, infrastructure, international support, logistics, and contractual relations. As a result, instead of a future, there is an empty symbol; instead of a breakthrough, there is isolation; and instead of progress, there is collapse. And now the main question: Do the Palestinian people themselves want this, or do they want to work, study, develop, and raise their children in a stable environment, not a perpetual state of struggle? If the answer is the latter, then recognition is not the beginning, but the end. And the real beginning is where responsibility, order, work, and a willingness to compromise emerge.  Only then will the state have a chance, and the world have an  opportunity.